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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! We regret that this 
year it will be a “paper only” event. The double whammy of sequestration and a continuing 
resolution, with the attendant restrictions on travel and conferences, created too much 
uncertainty to properly stage the event. We will miss the dialogue with our acquisition 
colleagues and the opportunity for all our researchers to present their work. However, we 
intend to simulate the symposium as best we can, and these Proceedings present an 
opportunity for the papers to be published just as if they had been delivered. In any case, we 
will have a rich store of papers to draw from for next year’s event scheduled for May 14–15, 
2014! 
Despite these temporary setbacks, our Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) continues at a normal pace. Since the ARP’s 
founding in 2003, over 1,200 original research reports have been added to the acquisition 
body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 70 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and encourage your future participation. 
Unfortunately, what will be missing this year is the active participation and 
networking that has been the hallmark of previous symposia. By purposely limiting 
attendance to 350 people, we encourage just that. This forum remains unique in its effort to 
bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. It provides the opportunity to interact with many top DoD 
acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal 
panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the 
day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming 
arrangements for future research work. Despite the fact that we will not be gathered 
together to reap the above-listed benefits, the ARP will endeavor to stimulate this dialogue 
through various means throughout the year as we interact with our researchers and DoD 
officials.  
Affordability remains a major focus in the DoD acquisition world and will no doubt get 
even more attention as the sequestration outcomes unfold. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s 
Better Buying Power initiatives, which continue to evolve as the DoD finds which of them 
work and which do not. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of 
great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or 
scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
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 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & 
Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, 
Department of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test, & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
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Abstract 
The lack of focus on complexity issues in System of Systems–related acquisitions prevents 
effective support for Better Buying Power (BBP) targets of affordability, innovation, increased 
productivity, and healthy competition in reducing costs and improving delivery of promised 
performance. The impetus is to provide the necessary analytical frameworks and associated 
tools that enable better informed decisions in support of BBP objectives. This paper extends 
our previous work in robust portfolio optimization and adopts a multi-period portfolio 
management approach to support the objectives of BBP. Derived from the financial 
engineering and operations research literature, robust multi-period portfolio management 
principles provide a decision-making framework that balances performance of a “portfolio” of 
systems, constituting, for example, a system of systems, against potential risks. The 
framework also balances short versus long term gains through its multi-period formulation. An 
illustrative example, using a Littoral Combat Ship–inspired naval warfare scenario, 
demonstrates application of the approach and potential use for acquisition practitioners. 
Introduction 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has emphasized a need for Better Buying 
Power (BBP) initiatives in tackling issues of increasing costs, schedule growth, and reduced 
productivity. The success of BBP policies in reducing costs have been well documented for 
a variety of cases that include the acquisition of Navy destroyers, reduction in production 
rates for the E-2D Hawkeye program, and cutting cycle times and cost of ammunitions 
through an improved small business acquisition strategy. However, the complexities of 
modern platforms that interact as a system of systems (SoS; Maier, 1998) present the risk of 
cascading modes of failure; this is due to the highly interdependent, yet operationally and 
managerially independent, interactions between the constituent systems. The desire to 
promote adequate competitions and growth of technological options in developing military 
capabilities has further increased the complexity of the acquisition process. This increase in 
complexity now includes the need to account for competitive elements in contracting, 
improving productivity, and reducing unnecessary redundancies. The management of Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) through a “should cost–will cost” imperative 
becomes increasingly difficult as acquisition decisions must carefully balance performance 
and risk, and time.   
The acquisition of systems with an SoS capability in mind increases the complexity. 
Current tools especially for this problem context are lacking. Figure 1 shows an abstraction 
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of the hierarchical and complex relationships among the individual layers of systems in 
satisfying requirements and consequently, desired overarching SoS level capabilities. 
 
 System of Systems Hierarchy 
The DoD (2012) Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) and DoD System of Systems 
SE guide provides fundamental guidance in tackling SoS-related acquisitions; however, 
these greatly lack the necessary depth and decision tools in support of BBP objectives. The 
lack of an effective decision support framework for managing acquisition risks has led to 
cascading cost overruns, schedule delays, and even program cancellations. Examples of 
these effects have been observed in several programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter, U.S. 
Army Future Combat Systems (FCS; Gilmore, 2006), and U.S. Navy Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS; O’Rourke, 2011) programs. Computational decision support frameworks are needed 
to adequately deal with the complexity of interconnected acquisition domains and to identify 
optimal collections of systems that mitigate cascading risks. 
Investment Portfolio Management: A Path to Better Buying Power  
Portfolio management techniques have been successfully applied to the 
management of strategic “portfolios of systems” in military acquisitions; this includes 
application of Real Options (RO) theory and metrics such as Knowledge-Value Added (KVA) 
that account for the value added by human and IT investments (Komorovski, Housel, Hom, 
& Mun, 2006). Work by Mun (2005) has developed an eight-phase process to addressing 
portfolio management of strategic assets. Work by Giachetti (2012) has applied stochastic 
techniques to managing military investments. Previous research funded by the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) and presented at the 2012 NPS Acquisition Research 
Symposium (Davendralingam, Mane, & DeLaurentis, 2012), has focused on a robust 
portfolio management problem of maximizing a warfighter SoS portfolio performance index 
while preserving budgetary and compatibility constraints of underlying military assets. The 
robust portfolio work complements prior research efforts to include algorithmic advances, 
explicit consideration of data uncertainty, and inclusion of SoS architectural information 
within a robust investment portfolio framework. The robust portfolio methodology is adapted 
from financial engineering literature and leverages potential gains in overall SoS capability 
against cost and developmental risks in selecting “baskets” of compatible, interdependent 
systems.  
Risks and capabilities associated with system interdependencies can span the 
functional or physical spaces of the SoS construct and is subject to uncertainty. The 
developed strategy supports acquisitions, both in the pre- and post-milestone B phases, and 
considers current initiatives such as open architecture (OA) and competitive contracting 
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(e.g., fixed-price initiatives) in improving affordability and BBP objectives while considering 
evolving military requirements. Work in this research extends the robust portfolio approach 
to include a multi-period portfolio perspective. The multi-period portfolio optimization 
approach draws upon a rich history of algorithmic development, as noted in operations 
research–related literature (Powell, 2011; Bertsimas & Pachamanova, 2008; Bertsekas, 
2005; Fabozzi, Kolm, Pachamanova, & Focardi, 2007; Tutuncu & Cornuejols, 2007). Its 
roots stem from sequential decision-making areas known broadly as dynamic programming 
or stochastic programming and adapts control theory methodologies to the dynamic 
management of resources in the interest of maximizing (or minimizing) some given metric. 
Stochastic programming focuses on issues of uncertainty whereas dynamic programming 
relates to the optimality of making sequential decisions; however, there has been a large 
degree of overlap and exchange between the two areas. Algorithmic development in these 
areas has been applied to a range of real-world dynamic decision-making problems that 
range from financial portfolio management to real-time control of vehicles.  
A Multi-Period Decision-Making Framework  
The multi-period portfolio approach enhances the robust portfolio decision-support 
framework and better enables optimal acquisitions of systems in maximizing SoS-wide 
capabilities. The construction of an appropriate dynamic policy, in the context of an 
acquisition management problem, translates to identifying actions that balance the potential 
gains in SoS capabilities against developmental risks (e.g., cost and schedule growth risks) 
over a specified time horizon. Figure 2 is an abstraction of the evolution of a “portfolio of 
systems” that constitute an SoS, as part of the wave model (Dahmann, Rebovich, Lane, 
Lowry, & Baldwin, 2011). 
 
 Wave Model Relation to Portfolio Evolution 
The wave model is an extension of the Department of Defense guidelines on 
systems engineering (SE) for an SoS that translates SoS SE core elements, 
interrelationships, and decision-making artifacts from a previous “Trapeze” model to a time-
sequenced model representation (Dahmann et al., 2011). These architectural decisions 
involve the acquisition of assets in evolving the SoS capabilities to meet core objectives; the 
SoSE architect’s role is to explore the trade space across multiple operationally independent 
domains in determining suggested architectural modifications (add/remove assets) in 
evolving the SoS. 
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A Multi-Period Decision Framework 
The objective of the robust multi-period portfolio framework is to allow for 
mathematical rigor of algorithmic techniques, transparent to the end user/practitioner, to 
support SoS-level acquisition decisions through identification of optimal “portfolios” of 
systems to be acquired in pursuit of desired SoS capabilities. While the acquisition process 
spans operationally and managerially independent defense groups, the tools and 
frameworks envisioned to support these aspects are aimed at providing adequate trade 
space exploration capabilities. These explorations require a domain agnostic framework, 
and hence intuitively resonate with the idea of treating the collection of systems across 
domains as a “portfolio” of systems in the SoS. 
 This is often the case in operations research and financial engineering applications, 
where underlying mathematical optimization frameworks are used to drive decision support 
software in assisting decision-makers (e.g., policymakers, investment specialists) in 
performing acquisition analysis. The concept naval warfare scenario in this paper 
demonstrates the application of the multi-period portfolio framework in managing the 
sequential acquisitions needed to propagate required capabilities while minimizing 
operational and developmental risks. The method illustrates the identification of optimal 
evolution of interconnected systems that cohesively function in providing an overarching 
SoS-wide capability. A robust optimization approach to the multi-period portfolio formulation 
addresses issues of data uncertainty. 
Development of a Multi-Period Investment Portfolio Model 
The acquisition (and removal) of systems in an evolving an SoS inherently involves a 
timeline of sequentially executed decisions. Decisions made at each epoch affect the 
decision options of future states, thus affecting long term performance and risks of the SoS 
gamut. The translation of these sequential decisions to the context of a multi-period 
investment model requires an adequate description of node (system) attributes; this ensures 
the selection of feasible portfolios that satisfy nodal requirements and minimize cascading 




 Archetypal Node (System) Behaviors 
In Figure 3, the capabilities of an existing SoS (initial blue nodes) have the potential 
to evolve, based on potential connections to yet-to-be acquired systems (dashed lines and 
nodes). At each decision epoch, the practitioner utilizes a decision-making framework (such 
as the multi-period portfolio framework) to evaluate the value and risks involved in the 
potential acquisitions of new systems (denoted by red dashed lines). The resulting new 
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collection of systems that comprise the new SoS construct now includes the addition of the 
new systems. 
An SoS is treated as a set of generic discrete nodes with the following attributes: 
 Capability (Outputs): Nodes have finite supply of capabilities that are limited 
by quantity (e.g., total power output of generator systems). 
 Requirements (Inputs): Nodes have individual requirements. Requirements 
are fulfilled by receiving capabilities from other nodes that can fulfill said set 
of requirements (e.g., a high powered AMDS radar requirement of energy can 
be fulfilled by multiple generators). 
 Compatibility: Nodes can only connect to other nodes based on a pre-
established set of rules (e.g., AMDS radar can only accept power from high 
capacity nuclear reactor systems on specific ships). 
Multi-Period Investment Portfolio Formulation  
The problem statement for a multi-period investment portfolio is translated to the 
language of mathematical programming. The process begins with the definition of two main 
elements of a mathematical program, namely, the objective function and constraints. The 
objective function is a mathematical expression that is formulated to reflect a key 
performance metric of the system to be maximized (or minimized). Typical formulations of 
the objective function seek, for example, to minimize direct costs of operating a fleet of 
aircraft. For an SoS, the objective function reflects a chosen measure of performance and 
associated costs. The second important aspect of a mathematical program is the formulation 
of the constraints. The constraints reflect physical, resource, and behavioral aspects of the 
systems as mathematical expressions. Our initial framework for a multi-period portfolio 
considers a long term horizon of acquisitions with discrete decision steps that denote 
periods of “investment”; these investments involve the addition/removal of individual 
systems that comprise the overall SoS network.  
The following mathematical program describes a preliminary framework for the multi-
period acquisition problem: 





ܺ௤,௧஻ ൌ ܺ௤,௧ିଵ஻ ൅ ܷ௤,௧஻ ൅ ௤ܸ,௧஻ 																																																																	(2) 









	ܺ௤,௧஻ 	(Satisfy Requirements at each t)  (5) 
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൫ ௜ܺ,௧஻ ൅. . ൅ܺ௡,௧஻ ൯௝,௧ ൌ ܯ௝,௧	݆ ൌ 1…݇	(Package System Compatibility) (6) 
ܺ௤,௧஻ , ܺ௤,௧ିଵ஻ , ܷ௤,௧஻ , ௤ܸ,௧஻ 	߳	ሾ0,1ሿ		t=0…T (time steps)                                (7) 
where: 
ݓ	- weighting factor vector that weights the importance of constituent capabilities of 
index 
ܴ௖	- baseline capability level for each of the capabilities that contribute to index 
ܥ௤,௧஻  - cost of acquiring system (q) at time (t) 
ܥ௧ௌ -cost of retiring system (q) at time (t) 
Equation 1 is the weighted objective function that seeks to maximize the end 
developed SoS performance index. Here, the index is related to the final state of the 
portfolio (ݐ ൌ ܶ) and is weighted according to the value that each capability (ܥ) contributes to 
the index (however, this can naturally reflect maximization of each stage, if necessary). The 
index is normalized by referencing it to some chosen reference capability set (ܴ௖). Equation 
2 reflects the evolutionary nature of the portfolio of chosen systems (ݍ) at time (ݐ), 
represented by the decision vector	ܺ௤,௧஻ . Here, the decision vector is binary, to reflect discrete 
system choices; however, a more general setting can allow for the variables to be 
continuous in nature.  
The terms ܷ௤,௧஻ ,	 and ௤ܸ,௧஻  reflect decisions to “acquire” and “remove/retire” individual 
systems respectively, in the portfolio of systems at each decision epoch of time (ݐ). Equation 
3 captures the “transactional” costs at each stage; this means that decisions to 
acquire/remove systems translate to costs associated with each that are accrued at each 
time step. In acquisitions, the removal cost translates to a salvage/swap cost for changing 
out individual systems whereas the “acquire” cost is simply the cost of purchasing and 
integrating a new system. Equation 4 ensures budgetary balance for total costs 
(transactional and acquisition) that occur.  
Equation 5 ensures that the total “capabilities” from systems acquired satisfy the 
requirements that individual systems may have; for example, there must be adequate power 
generating systems selected to support selected communications systems that provide 
some system-wide communications capability. Conditions for Equation 5 can be enforced at 
each time step (ݐ) or at the final stage (ݐ ൌ ܶ), depending on requirements at each time step. 
Equation 6 enforces compatibility constraints as binary conditions for a total of (݇) set of 
rules; for example, the constraint that only one engine can be selected to generate power 
would translate to a constraint of ݔଵ ൅ ݔଶ ൌ 1	where (ݔ1, ݔ2) are binary variables. The rules 
can be applied across decision epochs, reflecting the need to have prior systems in 
existence, before particular upgrades can be implemented in future time steps. Equation 7 
states that the decision variables are binary and that the time window consists of discrete 
steps from ݐ ൌ 0 to a final time ݐ ൌ ܶ. The problem formulation of Equations 1–7 constitutes 
a binary integer program, for which efficient methods of solution and commercial solvers are 
available. 
Robust Multi-Period Investment Portfolio  
The multi-period formulation of Equations 1–7 are deterministic and do not consider 
uncertainties in the data. Real world systems are inherently driven by uncertainty and thus 
challenge the optimality (and feasibility) of decisions made under deterministic assumptions. 
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Research in mathematical programming has progressively focused more on the 
development of robust optimization methods to deal with manifestations of uncertainty. 
Robust optimization seeks to find solutions, to uncertain mathematical programming 
problems, that are less sensitive to parametric variations in the problem being solved. We 
consider uncertainties in the data for Equations 1–7, namely in the “transaction costs” of 
Equations 3 and 4 that reflect system addition and removal costs. We also consider 
uncertainties in the capabilities of each system available. 
The consideration of the uncertainty in the multi-period formulation requires the use 
of robust optimization methods for solution. There are a range of methods that can address 
the uncertain linear structure of the resulting optimization problem; however, we adopt the 
Bertsimas–Sim (correlated case) approach for our preliminary multi-period framework. The 
Bertsimas–Sim method (Bertsimas & Sim, 2004) is a robust optimization approach to solving 
linear optimization problems with uncertain data. The method allows for a flexible 
adjustment in the level of conservatism of the robust solutions (termed the Price of 
Robustness) in terms of probabilistic bounds of constraint violations.  
We consider the following to be a general uncertain linear program: 
maximize ܿܶݔ																																																																												(8) 
subject to: 
ܣ௑ ൑ ܾ																																																																																		(9) 
 
	ݔ ൒ 0																																																																																(10) 
Where values ݆ܽ݅ of matrix A are uncertain and exist in the nominally symmetric 
bounds of	ሾܽ௜௝ െ ܽ௜௝, ܽ௜௝ ൅ ܽ௜௝ሿ. The uncertainties are treated as constraint-wise uncertainties. 
In the correlated case, the uncertainties are modelled as the following equation: 
തܽ௜௝ ൌ ܽ௜௝ ൅ ෍ ߟ௜௞	݃௞௝
௞ఢ	௄೔
																																																																		(11) 
where ߟ௜௞are the independent and symmetric random variables [-1, 1], and there are ݇ 
number of uncertain sources. The robust optimization problem to the correlated case can be 





ݖ௜Γ௜ ൅ ෍ ݌௜௝ ൑ ܾ௜
௝ఢ	௃೔
																																																										(13) 




௝݈ ൑ ݔ௝ ൑ ݕ௝																																																																																(16) 
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݌௜௝, ݕ௜௝, ݖ௜௝ ൒ 0																																																																														(17) 
where ݌݆݅, ݕ݆݅, ݖ݆݅ are the dual variables associated with the dual problem of the nonlinear 
formulation of the Bertsimas–Sim method (See Bertsimas and Sim [2004] for full derivation), 
and J is the set of uncertain coefficients. The conservatism term, Γ௜, is adjusted to control 
probabilistic guarantees of constraint (݅) violation. For example, changing Γ, for linear 
constraints that dictates power distribution flow over a network, controls the probability of net 
power being supplied at a prescribed level of cost. The constraint violation probability 
bounds for individual constraints can be approximated using the following De Moivre 
approximation of the binomial distribution (Bertsimas & Sim, 2004): 
ܤሺ݊, Γ௜ሻ ൎ 1 െ Φ൬Γ௜ െ 1√݊ ൰ 																																																																	(18) 
where ݊ is the หܬ݅൓ห and Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function. The manipulation of Γ in controlling the probability of constraint violation, allows for an intuitive interpretation of 
the conservatism of solutions generated and permits practitioners the means of assessing 
solution performances against associated risk in terms of individual constraint violations.  
Robustification: Bertsimas–Sim (Correlated) Approach  
The robust (correlated) implementation of the Bertsimas–Sim approach in Equations 
11–17 is applied to the multi-period model of Equations 1–7. The following equations 
described the robustified budget constraints for the multi-period model, in particular the 





൅ ݖΓ ൅෍ ௝ܲ
௝ఢ௃೔
൑ Budget                                                  (19) 




௝݈ ൑ ݔ௝ ൑ ݕ௝																																																																																		(22) 
݌௜௝, ݕ௜௝, ݖ௜௝ ൒ 0																																																																																	(23) 
where ݔ௝	is the concatenated decision vector ൛ܺ௤,௧ୀ்஻ 	 ௤ܸ,௧ୀ଴,ଵ,ଶ஻ ൟ	associated with all 
transactions ሺݐ ൌ 0,1, 2ሻ. 
Interpretation of Risk 
The inclusion of correlation information reflects an important contribution where 
protection levels of each robust constraint, in the non-correlated case assumes the 
simultaneous worst-case scenarios at the uncertainty bounds–a condition that is highly 
improbable. The correlated case accounts for the simultaneous “movements” in 
performance and risks across the capabilities of individual assets. Prior research has utilized 
a mixed integer semidefinite programming (MISDP) approach to dealing with uncertainties in 
the covariance matrix, a matrix that is associated with variances (risk) in system 
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development time. However, there are very limited solvers that are able to solve MISDPs, 
which limits practical implementation, despite some of the computational advantages in 
dealing with uncertainty. 
Concept Application: Naval Acquisition Scenario 
The Naval Acquisition Scenario is based on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) model 
(LCS, 2011). The LCS (Figures 4 and 5) is a naval combat vessel, developed by Lockheed 
Martin and General Dynamics, as a result of the Navy’s dual contracting efforts to reduce 
cost through competition. The design of these ships seeks to provide a more agile and cost-
effective solution to various near shore environment missions. These missions are executed 
through use of interchangeable ship packages that include Mine Warfare (MIW), Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW), and Surface Warfare (SUW). The highly modular design of the 
platform allows for a great degree of operational flexibility. The modularity also translates to 
the ability for open architecture and small business initiatives to be brought to bear in 
reducing program costs and improving competition. Our ongoing work in this paper assumes 
an LCS-inspired scenario as representative “simple” SoS model where the objective is to 
identify potential sequence of investment decisions and the corresponding end collection of 
systems that can best maximize core capabilities of the SoS mission (in this case, MIW, 
ASW, and SUW).  
Our highly simplified model consists of a hypothetical list of candidate systems, listed 
in Table 1, that are available to the Navy for acquisition. Although the numbers presented in 
the table are fictitious, the salient features of capability, requirements, cost, and uncertainty 
are nevertheless represented. Each subset of systems (listed by categories of ASW, MCM, 
SUW, Seaframe, Comm) represents a subset collection of systems that are available in 
meeting the needs of each category. The ASW, MCM, and SUW categories are the core 
LCS mission packages. “Seaframe” reflects the ship seaframe support options, and 
“Communications” represents the support communications systems available for 
deployment. The first five columns show capabilities of each system, and their respective 
numerical valuations. Columns 6 and 7 are the Power and Communications requirements 
needed for operation of the listed systems, in providing the capabilities listed. Also listed are 
the acquisition (buy) and retiring (sell/salvage) costs, along with the estimated uncertainty of 
each cost. We consider uncertainty in costs for this simplified problem; however, more 
general uncertainty in capabilities or requirements can be introduced in the same fashion.  
 
 Concept of Operations 
Note. Image taken from presentation slides by RDML Vic Guillory of OPNAV at the Mine Warfare 
Association Conference (titled “Littoral Combat Ship”), May 8, 2007. 
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 General Dynamics Independence Class LCS 
 LCS Candidate System Scenario 
 
Naval Acquisition Scenario: Results 
The problem statement for the above LCS-inspired acquisition problem is formulated 
as a mathematical program that follows the robustified formulation of Equations 1–7. The 
resulting problem is then solved for varying values of conservatism, Γi, to reflect a range of 
dynamically evolving acquisitions, at each prescribed level of conservatism. Here, we 
assume conservatism in dealing with the costs uncertainties of acquisitions; each chosen 
value of Γ (here, three values) in this context thus reflects the probability of budget overruns 
occurring due to the associated costs uncertainties in each stage of acquisition. We assume 
a three-stage (t=0,1,2) acquisition process, where the systems listed in Table 1 can be 
acquired or retired at each stage, culminating to a final “portfolio” of assets at the end of 
stage 3 (t=2). Acquisition or retirement of these systems is subject to a prescribed set of 
rules that govern their compatibility and availabilities in time (systems only available at 
specific epochs) as reflected in Equation 6 of the problem formulation. Figure 6 shows the 
SoS performance frontier tradeoff against degree of conservatism in the budget constraint. 
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 Performance Index Frontier 
Figure 6 highlights three dynamic portfolios at conservatism level of Γ = 0.001, 0.5, 
and 1 respectively; increasing values of Γ indicate a higher degree of conservatism. Each 
point corresponding to a particular chosen level of conservatism reflects a sequence of 
acquisition decisions that lead to the final portfolio performance index denoted on the graph. 
The sequence of acquisitions for each level of conservatism is shown in Table 2, where “1” 
denotes a decision to acquire a particular system at that time step, ݐ. Figure 7 shows the 
normalized capability index for each subset of capabilities that comprise the index (in this 
case, weapons strike range, surface detection range, and anti-mine detection range) of each 
of the optimal points in Figure 6.  
The results in Table 2 indicate evolving portfolio of systems where individual systems 
are acquired and retired throughout the decision epochs, preserving the satisfaction of 
requirements, towards maximizing the end goal of the overall SoS portfolio at time ݐ ൌ ܶ. 
Retirements are denoted by the evolution from a previously selected state (e.g., ݔ௝௧=1 at ݐ ൌ
2) to a state of (e.g., ݔ௝௧ ൌ 0 at ݐ ൌ 3). At a high level of conservatism (Γ ൌ 1.0), we observe 
the expected case of the portfolio being constant, where the initial investments are held over 
the entire decision horizon without any retirement or further acquisitions; this reflects the 
condition where risks associated with the buy/retire transactions are deemed to be too great, 
hence prompting the selection of a lower capability but less financially risky acquisition 
strategy. At the low and mid-levels of conservatism, there is a possibility of sequential 
acquisitions, subject to the availability and compatibility rules between systems, that can 
result in higher performing portfolios but at higher prescribed level of acquisition risk. 
The results of Table 2 and Figure 7 afford practitioners a candid view of the 
“topology” of acquisitions that can optimally be made over time, assuming a tolerance of risk 
for, in this case, and budgetary risk. The risk uses correlated information on the costs and is 
quantified as the probability associated with the budget constraint violation. The analysis 
result presented can be useful to decision-makers in assessing the potential dynamic 
purchasing/retirement decisions that need to be made in view of quantifiable uncertainties. It 
also allows the decision-maker to assess the trade-offs between performance and risks in 
decisions at each epoch of the acquisition process, while bearing independencies and 
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system compatibilities in mind. The mapping of the dynamic acquisition trade-space can 
also better inform independent acquisition groups, within an SoS, on the potential actions 
that various collaborative acquisition strategies can have on the overall scheme of 
development. 




 SoS Capability Spread at Varying Conservatism 
Conclusions and Future Work 
The development of a portfolio of systems to serve in an SoS context is a difficult 
endeavor. Complex interdependencies and uncertainties abound in both capabilities and 
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requirements of its constituent systems. There is an absence of adequate frameworks and 
tools to enable effective navigation of the resulting trades-spaces. Research in this paper 
presents a preliminary framework for a robust multi-period portfolio approach to facilitate 
selection of systems for acquisition in this context. The framework is naturally based on 
multi-period portfolio and robust optimization techniques, and it has shown promise in 
assessing the impact that various degrees of risk aversion (here, conservatism) on 
acquisition related decision epochs.  
The simple LCS-inspired Naval Warfare Scenario demonstrates application of the 
framework; the objective is to identify optimal acquisition decisions (buy/retire) at each 
decision epoch, assuming various levels of conservatism in budget violations. The analysis 
affords practitioners a candid view of the dynamic acquisition trade-space and allows for the 
selection of systems at the prescribed levels of accepted conservatism. In the larger context 
of acquisition affordability objectives, the algorithmic framework established here has direct 
bearing on BBP focus areas, as listed in Table 3. 























Our future work will leverage the robust multi-period approach by incorporating 
relevant metrics and perspectives, as listed in Table 3 above, to more explicitly account for 
sequential decision-making processes in promoting affordability in defense acquisitions. 
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